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Report on the Mission to Validate the Pilot County 
Mine Action Plan for Croatia 
 
Summary 
 
The initial proposal to prepare a pilot County Mine Action Plan (CMAP) 
proved overly ambitious because a great deal of work was required to 
systematically re-survey the areas suspected of landmine contamination and 
to compile socio-economic and physical planning data from a variety of 
sources. The initial proposal did not envisage the use of Multi-Criteria 
Analysis (MCA). MCA (specifically, the PROMETHEE method) was added 
about six months after the start of the pilot CMAP exercise, but then became 
the core methodology used both to structure the priority-setting problem and 
to analyse the data. The pilot project experienced significant delays, but 
these were not due to the MCA approach. The principal delay stemmed from 
the need to systematically re-survey all suspected minefields in the county, 
but this effort also brought significant benefits by reducing the area 
suspected of contamination in Sisacko-Moslavacka County from about 800 
km2 to about 200 km2. 
 
The MCA methodology eventually was used to address two distinct decisions. 
First, which municipalities or cities should receive priority? Second, which of 
the suspected minefields (defined by GIS polygons) should receive priority? 
For the second decision, two priority rankings were formulated: one from the 
perspective of county politicians and the other from the perspective of 
municipal politicians.  
 
The pilot CMAP using MCA methodology achieved only partial success. The 
effort to rank municipalities and cities in terms of priority appears to have 
been successful, but that for ranking specific polygons appears to have been 
flawed. The problem in the latter case stems from the difficulty in defining 
‘homogeneous’ polygons that can be compared in a valid manner. This led to 
the identification of the largest polygons as the priorities, with the result that 
more than half the total contaminated area in the county was defined as 
priority; an area that appears to be 15-to-20 times larger than will be 
certified as safe in 2003 through technical survey and mine clearance. 
Therefore, CROMAC had to use its traditional processes to determine the 
specific areas within each polygon that will be technically survey and, where 
necessary, cleared in 2003.  
 
The pilot CMAP effort also failed to incorporate cost considerations explicitly 
into the priority ranking exercise using MCA, or to incorporate community 
participation to any significant degree. As a result, the pilot effort in using 
MCA methodology can only be adjudged as a very partial success. At the 
same time, the MCA approach appears to be very promising. In particular, it 
can cope with the ‘hierarchical’ structure of the decisions on mine action 
priorities in Croatia: one decision on how to allocate the national budget 
among counties; the next on how to allocate a county mine action budget 
among cities and municipalities; the third on which polygons should be 
priorities. It also can cope with large amounts and different types of data, 
and with input from a variety of groups (civil society organisations; interest 
groups; etc.). By structuring the problem carefully and by making the 
criteria and indicators explicit, MCA also has the potential to increase 
transparency. The PROMETHEE MCA method that was utilised also can 
cope with large amounts, and many types, of data, which would facilitate the 
analysis of the socio-economic impacts of mine contamination and mine 
action. In brief, the MCA approach is relevant and offers very significant 
potential benefits. The pilot project realised some but not the bulk of these 
potential benefits, which is not a surprising result considering the 
complexity of priority-setting for mine action. A good deal was learned in the 
pilot and the validation team believes many of the shortcomings can be 
addressed in the next iteration. 
 
Introduction 
 
This report covers the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of a 
mission from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Mine Action 
(GICHD) on behalf of the UNDP-Croatia and the Croatian Mine Action Centre 
(CROMAC) undertaken from 11-15 November 2002. The purpose of the 
mission was to assess the relevance and effectiveness of the methods used to 
develop the pilot County Mine Action Plan (CMAC) in Croatia. The mission 
team comprised Eric Filippino, Head of the Socio-Economic Unit at GICHD, 
and Ted Paterson, an independent consultant. 
 
Objectives and Focus of the Mission 
 
As provided by the Terms of Reference (attached in full as Annex 1), “the 
objectives of the validation are to: 
 
• assess the relevance and effectiveness of the methodology employed 
• identify any shortcomings in the methodology 
• based on the findings, to make recommendations for changes to the 
methodology and improvements that should be included within the advice 
and guidance to be provided by UNDP …” 
 
The following excerpt from the Terms of Reference served to identify critical 
issues (shown in added highlights) on which the mission should focus:  
 
“The pilot plan was intended to serve as a model for the staff of all four Regional 
Centres, to create decentralised CMAPs. The model was to be transparent, and 
incorporate community involvement and define priorities that took into account 
social and economic opportunity costs.” 
 
Therefore, in addition to the assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of 
the Multi-Criteria Analysis methodology, the mission team sought to address 
the following questions: 
 
• Was the methodology used in the pilot CMAP transparent?  
• Does the methodology incorporate community involvement? 
• Did the methodology identify priorities based, in large part, on socio-
economic considerations? 
• Does the pilot represent a model that would be suitable for other CMAPs 
to be developed in a decentralised fashion by the Regional MACs? 
 
Findings 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The existing system for developing the national mine action plan and for 
identifying priority tasks has evolved over time. In the immediate post-war 
period, mine clearance was seen as an integral part of the reconstruction 
effort and priorities for survey and clearance were determined by plans for 
reconstruction, the return of refugees and displaced persons, and special 
projects to upgrade the national infrastructure, clear the Sava River for 
navigation, etc. In this sense, mine clearance was ‘demand-led’ in its initial 
phases and, in general, the priorities were starkly clear.1 As is normal, 
however, the problem of identifying priorities becomes more difficult once the 
most obviously pressing problems are addressed. 
 
Following the establishment and build-up of CROMAC in 1998, the first 
county demining plans were prepared in 1999 and the national mine action 
programme was adopted by the House of Representatives in October 2000. 
The annual national plans for demining are basically a compilation of (1) the 
county plans, and ‘top-down’ priorities derived from the work programmes of 
(2) the central ministries, and (3) the key state-owned enterprises. To some 
outside observers, including donors, it was unclear how priorities were being 
established within each county, whether politicians in the different counties 
were setting priorities based on similar criteria, and the degree to which 
socio-economic factors were considered when setting priorities. Accordingly, 
a project was proposed to “…improve the County Mine Action Plans up to an 
international standard where socio-economic argumentation is used to set 
the priorities.’”  
 
THE PROPOSAL FOR THE PILOT COUNTY MINE ACTION PLAN2 
 
The initial proposal was to develop a CMAP to serve as a pilot for other 
counties which collectively would form the basis for the national mine action 
plan. The plan envisaged a January 2001 start with the pilot county plan 
completed in June, followed by the remaining CMAPs and the national plan 
by the end of that year.  
 
Six sub-groups were established for the pilot, including one for Socio-
Economics that was to “define and execute an impact survey’” and one for 
Survey that was to “define and execute survey level II including area 
reduction.” Both of these tasks are significant undertakings and it should 
surprise no one that the April completion deadline was not achieved.3 As 
well, the Socio-Economic Group lacked models for conducting a socio-
economic impact survey to support the production of the pilot CMAC4 or for 
analysing the socio-economic data that were collected.5 
 
                                                 
1 When this is true, priorities often will be ‘objective’ in the sense that different decision-markers – 
when presented the same information – would arrive at very similar lists of priority tasks, and outside 
observers can readily verify that the tasks undertaken were clear priorities, even if the criteria and 
processes used for selecting these tasks are not completely explicit. 
2 Quotations in this section are from Project Plan: County Mine Action Plan, version 6 February 2001. 
3 The Survey Group did not conduct a level II (or technical) survey as it is traditionally understood in 
the mine action field. Rather, it conducted what might be termed a ‘systematic resurvey’ to update data 
on each suspected hazard in the CROMAC database. In doing so, it was able to reduce the area 
suspected of contamination within Sisak-Moslavacka County from about 800 km2 to 200 km2. 
4 The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) methodology developed by the Survey Action Center is designed 
to collect socio-economic impact data for setting priorities, but such surveys are major undertakings 
and beyond the scope and budget of the Pilot CMAC Project. As well, the LIS methodology has not yet 
been used in a more developed environment such as Croatia, in which very significant amounts of data 
are available. Other socio-economic studies of mine action have been designed to demonstrate the 
feasibility and importance of socio-economic analysis for mine action; not to produce a roadmap for 
systematically incorporating socio-economic data into the planning and priority-setting processes. 
5 In the end, a socio-economic survey was not undertaken. Instead, socio-economic and other data were 
obtained via the County Institute for Urban Development, the Bureau of Statistics, and various 
ministries.  
THE PILOT APPLICATION OF MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS 
 
The original plan for the Pilot CMAP made no mention of Multi-Criteria 
Analysis (MCA). This approach was incorporated about the middle of 2001 
when Mr. Nenad Mladineo from the University of Split was engaged as an 
advisor, using funding provided by CIDA.6 Mr. Mlanineo and a two-person 
team of GIS specialists devoted about three months over the remainder of 
2001 on the pilot CMAP effort.  
 
The specific MCA methodology used is termed Preference Ranking 
Organisation METHod for Enrichment Evaluations (PROMETHEE). Like any 
decision theory methodology, it first requires a thorough understanding of 
the problem so a model can be formulated for analysis. After a series of 
discussions with CROMAC, Mr. Mladineo identified the following problem 
characteristics: 
 
• Mine clearance is extremely expensive, so resource constraints preclude 
the clearance of all, or a significant proportion, of the contaminated area 
in the short- to medium-term; 
• There are many different groups affected by the contamination, and their 
interests are in many cases in conflict (i.e., each group would select 
different areas for priority clearance); 
• There is a hierarchy of decisions. For mine action in Croatia, the problem 
of allocating mine action assets can be separated into decisions 
concerning how much to provide [i] for each county (termed the ‘strategic 
decision’ in the documentation), then [ii] for each municipality within a 
county (tactical decision), and finally [iii] for clearance of specific hazards 
within a municipality (operational decision). 
 
Concerning the last point, as the pilot project was to prepare a county MAP, 
the exercise embraced only the ‘tactical’ and ‘operational’ decisions. Thus, we 
can define:  
 
• Decision 1: how to allocate the available county budget across the cities 
and municipalities (hereinafter, municipalities). 
• Decision 2a: how to allocate the available municipal budget to clear 
specific hazards. 
 
Structuring the exercise in this manner implies that county officials divide at 
least some of the mine action budget among municipalities, and then let the 
municipal officials determine which hazards to clear. Of course, it is 
conceivable that county officials could bypass the municipal officials and 
select which hazards to clear on a county-wide basis.7 In this case, there 
would be a single decision at the county level, as follows: 
                                                 
6 We understand the contact with Mr. Mladineo initially was made by a member of the CROMAC 
Scientific Council, and that the proposal for funding was submitted to the Canadian Embassy in Zagreb 
in the winter of 2001. We understand the original proposal was to use MCA for ‘backward 
engineering’ analysis (i.e., to analyse what criteria were used in selecting priorities for clearance in the 
past), but this was abandoned in favour of using all the funds in support of the pilot CMAP effort. 
7 While the pilot project envisaged greater input from civil society groups, it recognised that “setting of 
priorities is a task for the politicians.” (Project Plan: County Mine Action Plan, version 6 February 
2001, Annex 3, Section 3.3)  
 
• Decision 2b: how to allocate the available county budget to clear specific 
hazards. 
 
The following table summarises the three decisions. 
 
No. What is being decided Who decides 
1 Resources allocated to each municipality. County 
2a Resources allocated to each hazard. Municipality 
2b Resources allocated to each hazard. County 
 
The problem must then be defined, which requires defining the alternatives 
(e.g., hazards which could be cleared) and formulating the criteria and 
indicators8 to guide decision-makers in selecting – or giving priority to – 
some alternatives rather than others.  
 
The alternatives for decision/problem 1 are the 11 municipalities. For 
decisions/problems 2a and 2b, the CROMAC team used the ‘systematic 
resurvey’ work done by the Survey Group to define 72 polygons of suspected 
contamination, which served as the alternatives.  
 
Concerning the criteria, the following are listed in The County Plan of 
Demining Priorities for Sisako-Moslavacka County on the Basis of Multicriterial 
Analysis (hereinafter, The MCA CMAP): 
 
• Humanitarian consequences; 
• Reconstruction; 
• Economic growth; 
• Technical-technological parameters; 
• Ecological parameters. (The MCA CMAP, p. 4)9 
 
Typically, criteria are phrased in fairly broad terms. This is important to 
ensure people are clear of the true goals (e.g., to reduce the physical danger 
to the settled and returning populations) thus avoiding an overly narrow 
focus on, say, clearing the maximum number of square metres. However, it 
is difficult to determine in an objective or consistent fashion how well the 
programme is performing relative to a broadly defined criterion. Indicators 
are ways to measure or assess how much an alternative (i.e., a possible 
clearance task) satisfies a criterion. For example, ‘agricultural land’ might be 
used as an indicator of economic growth potential; similarly ‘past landmine 
accidents’ might be an indicator for the ‘humanitarian consequences’ 
criterion.  
 
                                                 
8 The documentation on the pilot CMAP does not distinguish clearly between the terms ‘indicator’ and 
‘criterion.’ Nevertheless, the distinction is important and the international development community 
typically puts great store in ‘objectively verifiable indicators’, so we will employ the term clarify for 
donors some of the potential links between MCA and the analytical approaches used in planning, 
managing, and evaluating aid projects. 
9 However, it is unclear the degree to which each of these criteria featured in the pilot exercise: in 
particular, the ‘technical-technological parameters’ seem not to have been integrated into the analysis, 
it is unclear how ‘reconstruction’ differs from ‘economic growth’, and it is unclear how ‘humanitarian 
consequences’ was addressed.  
It appears that three distinct problems – corresponding to the three 
decisions listed above (1, 2a, 2b) – were defined as part of the pilot exercise: 
 
Problem 1: How to allocate the available county budget across the cities and 
municipalities? The alternatives are the 11 municipalities within Sisako-
Moslavacka county. The criterion was ‘humanitarian consequences’ as 
measured by an index of ‘objectively estimated risk’ facing the populations 
within each of the municipalities. The list of indicators used to calculate the 
index appears to have included at least the following: 
 
• The area (square metres) of land suspected of contamination; 
• The ratio of contaminated land10 to the total area of the municipality; 
• The numbers of people living within or adjacent to the contaminated 
land; 
• The numbers of people living within 100 metres on either side of 
infrastructure (roads etc.); 
• Landmine and UXO accidents; 
• Expected returns. 
 
This analysis led to the following priority ranking of the cities and 
municipalities:11 
 
1. Sunja 2. Petrinja 3. Jasenovac 
4. Dvor 5. Glina 6. Sisak 
7. Dubica 8. Novska 9. Topusko 
10. Kostanjnica 11. Gvozd  
 
For problems 2a and 2b, Mr. Mladineo worked with CROMAC and County 
personnel to construct lists of indicators (i) that were relevant to the various 
criteria and (ii) that could be measured objectively with the data available 
(much of which was in GIS format) or otherwise ‘valued’ by relevant experts 
(e.g., CROMAC personnel, county officials, ICRC representatives). Over 20 
indicators (The MCA CMAP refers to these as ‘categories’) were used in the 
pilot effort (See Appendix 2).12  
 
Various groups (county officials, municipal officials, etc.) then were asked to 
assign weights to the different indicators to provide a gauge of how 
important each type of land or infrastructure was deemed to be by the 
members of that group. This then allowed the calculation of a ‘value’ or 
‘score’ for each alternative (hazard polygon) using the PROMETHEE 
methodology, following which the alternatives could be ranked in terms of 
their ‘score’.13  
                                                 
10 For ease in exposition, we will use the phrase ‘contaminated land’ in place of the more correct but 
unwieldy ‘land suspected of contamination.’ 
11 In fact, different versions of this index were calculated. CROMAC seems to have placed most weight 
on the percentage of land area within each municipality that is contaminated (see The MCA CMAP, 
Table 1, p. 15). Some other documents focus on the numbers of people within a contaminated area. 
(Choosing the optimal policies for risk reduction in mine contaminated areas, p. 4 and p. 6) 
12 Some of these indicators were dropped as they were relevant for only one municipality. 
13 PROMETHEE is one of a broader family of ‘outranking’ approaches. Outranking is based on the 
systematic comparison of each alternative against each of the other alternatives (termed ‘pairwise 
comparison’) for each criterion. In loose terms, if alternative A is at least as good as alternative B for 
 
In the pilot study, two rankings for the hazard polygons were generated: one 
using the criteria weights of the county officials and the second using those 
of the municipal officials. There was significant congruity between the 
polygons identified as priorities by county- and municipal-level officials, but 
a few differences were apparent, as depicted in the following table: 
 
Polygon # Municipality Municipal Ranking (only 
polygons in municipality) 
County Ranking (all 
polygons in county) 
B67 Sunja 1 1 
B66 Sunja 2 5 
B68 Sunja 3 9 
B28 Sunja 4 10 
 
B20 Petrinja 1 2 
B23 Petrinja 2 4 
B24 Petrinja 3 8* 
B21 Petrinja 4 7* 
 
B10 Glina 1 23* 
B14 Glina 2 11* 
 
B26 Sisak 1 3 
 
B06 Dvor 1 6 
 
B37 Jasenovac 1 20* 
B48 Jasenovac 3 17* 
* County ranking order differs from municipal ranking order. 
Data obtained from The MCA CMAP, Table III, pp. 20-21, and Table IV, p. 22. 
 
The fact that some of the priority rankings were different for county and 
municipal officials is not surprising. For example, officials in one 
municipality might give scant weight to mine clearance in support of flood 
control measures if these serve to protect a downstream municipality, but 
county officials would have to consider the wellbeing of citizens in both 
municipalities. One of the potential strengths of a number of the MCA 
approaches – including PROMETHEE – is in the clear identification of those 
alternatives (e.g., hazard polygons) for which the priority ranking does 
change as a result of the different weightings. The ‘conflicts’ are, therefore, 
made concrete and can be discussed to see if they can be resolved or at least 
narrowed. We understand however that this was not done during the pilot 
project. Instead, CROMAC and/or county officials decided on the following 
approach: 
 
• Some demining would be done in each of the eleven municipalities in 
2003; 
                                                                                                                                            
the majority of criteria, and is not significantly worse than alternative B on any other criterion, then 
alternative A is said to ‘outrank’ alternative B. The authors do not have sufficient background in 
Operations Research to evaluate the PROMETHEE method, but did obtain a number of academic 
papers and case studies which indicate that the methodology is widely accepted and has been used for 
the analysis of many complex problems, particularly in the field of environmental management. 
• Within each municipality, some part of the municipality’s highest priority 
polygon would be cleared;14 
• The remaining demining resources would be allocated according to 
county-level priorities. 
 
CROMAC officials used the above rules, plus the findings from the MCA 
analysis, to generate their proposed Mine Action Plan for 2003 for Sisak-
Moslavacka County.15  
 
Conclusions 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
First, it must be emphasised that Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) is properly 
viewed as a decision-support system rather than decision-making system. 
Elected politicians have the legal responsibility and authority to make 
decisions concerning mine action priorities in Croatia. Such decisions 
benefit from the recommendations proffered by mine action officials, and 
such recommendations should be based on thorough analysis. MCA 
promises to enhance such analysis to support – but not replace – the 
recommendations and final decisions. 
 
Second, while CROMAC is not the first to employ MCA for mine action (the 
Survey Action Center uses an MCA approach in generating priorities from its 
Landmine Impact Surveys), the pilot CMAP project entails a number of 
important innovations. A more sophisticated MCA methodology is employed 
(PROMETHEE) to take advantage of the far greater amount of socio-
economic, demographic, ecological, and other data available in Croatia. An 
MCA specialist was engaged as a consultant to assist CROMAC personnel in 
the pilot effort. A sophisticated software programme (Decision Lab 2000) was 
used to facilitate the analysis. The priority-setting process was properly 
diagnosed as a hierarchical system of decisions. 
 
Third, as is to be expected in a pilot effort featuring a number of innovations, 
both CROMAC personnel and Mr. Mladineo were on steep ‘learning curves’. 
Together, they have found solutions to some – but not all – of the problems 
in harnessing MCA for mine action planning, and have reaped some – but 
not all – of the benefits from this approach. In particular: 
• The results obtained depend on significant amounts of parallel or 
preparatory work being done (systematic re-surveys; collection of data). 
Much of this work is valuable in its own right, but it represents a 
substantial effort; 
• Some technical problems were not fully resolved in the pilot (definition of 
polygons); 
• The pilot did not embrace the strategic decision-level (how resources 
should be allocated among Croatia’s counties) and did not apply MCA to 
                                                 
14 Many of the 72 polygons were extremely large – some over 35 million m2. Clearance of the entire 
polygon would be infeasible in such cases as the annual clearance capacity in Croatia is only 30 million 
m2 or less. 
15 CROMAC officials had also decided to tender larger clearance tasks for 2003 in recognition of the 
high mobilisation costs faced by demining contractors. 
the lowest-level decision (i.e., determining how much and which parts of 
the high priority polygons will be demined in 2003); 
• Time did not allow for the involvement of a full range of civil society 
organisations and interest groups (farmers, tourism businesses, etc.) in 
the pilot process; 
• The set of criteria and indicators are not yet fully developed, and overlaps 
among indicators may mean that certain types of benefits are being 
counted/weighted more than once;16 
• As pilot project, the on-going effort required to benefit from the use of 
MCA for planning and priority-setting is not reflected in organisational 
structure of CROMAC. 
 
The major problem at this point appears to be the definition of the polygons. 
For the PROMETHEE system to work properly, these should be 
‘homogeneous’, but the 72 defined polygons are not: for example, polygons 
vary in size between 38,445,502 m2 and 2,812 m2. The way the 
PROMETHEE methodology was applied also made it far more likely that the 
largest polygons would be identified as priorities, as depicted on the graph 
below.17  
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This appears to the validation team to be a flaw in the methodology as it was 
applied in the pilot. The ranking seems to reflect the total score of all the 
‘valued things’ (i.e., items covered by the indicators used) within each 
polygon – regardless of size – rather than the score per square metre. It 
should surprise no one that a polygon of 20 million m2 scores higher in 
absolute terms than one of 200,000 m2. But the first polygon would also cost 
perhaps 100 times as much to demine. Put another way, priorities should be 
set based on the ratio of benefits to costs, but the pilot study seems to have 
identified the polygons promising the largest benefits without giving any 
consideration to the costs. We believe this apparent flaw can be corrected. 
                                                 
16 For example, there are separate indicators for ‘forests’, ‘national parks’, ‘nature reserves’, and 
‘hunting areas’. If national parks and nature reserves are largely forested, then the value of forests is 
essentially being counted three times. Similarly, if hunting areas are largely forested, we may have a 
similar problem of multiple counting. 
17 We are unsure whether this is due to (1) the likelihood that larger polygons would contain more 
‘valued things’ (i.e., items covered by the indicators used), (2) the likelihood that larger polygons 
would contain larger amounts of any particular ‘valued thing’ (e.g., agricultural land), or both. 
 
TRANSPARENCY 
 
MCA increases transparency in some important ways. It requires that 
criteria and indicators are made explicit, along with the weightings attached 
to these by various groups. All these could be reported upon and 
independently verified. It imposes a far more structured and systematic 
process, the adherence to which also could be verified. It also highlights 
conflicts between priority rankings of different groups, setting the stage for 
discussions to illuminate the underlying reasons for these conflicts (i.e., 
different interests in one form or another). As well, the MCA process 
generates a reasonably clear priority ranking of the polygons. If politicians 
decided that one or more polygons not on the MCA priority list should be 
demined, then audits or evaluations could focus on those specific polygons 
and the reasons they were selected. More fundamentally perhaps, once there 
is more community involvement in the MCA process (see the discussion on 
community involvement, below), civil society organisations and interest 
groups are likely to be better informed and in a position to exercise more 
effective oversight of local politicians than is presently the case. 
 
However, the MCA methodology was not employed for the entire priority-
setting process (i.e. all the decisions in the hierarchy). In particular, it was 
not used for determining which specific areas within the priority polygons 
would be demined. This is an extremely important point, in part because (as 
noted above) the MCA methodology was applied in a manner which led to the 
identification of the largest polygons as priorities. The 11 priority polygons 
on the ‘county list’ comprise over 148 square km, or 68 per cent of the entire 
contaminated area in the county. Croatia’s total clearance capacity is less 
than 30 square km/year. Assuming 5 square km might be cleared in 
Sisacko-Moslavacka in 2003, only about three per cent of the so-called 
priority area will in fact be cleared in the coming year. Even if area reduction 
via further surveys is included, only a small percentage of the ‘priority’ area 
will be released for safe use in the coming year. This leaves ample 
opportunity for selecting certain land for clearance based on non-
transparent criteria. We understand the MCA methodology could be used to 
restructure the priority-setting ‘problem’ so that more tightly targeted areas 
would be selected for priority attention, and this should be attempted in the 
next iteration.  
 
The use of a methodology such as MCA also has the potential to diminish 
transparency for two reasons, both of which can be addressed. First, the 
results obtained depend on experts and the techniques are not easily 
grasped by politicians and members of the public. There is a requirement for 
a clear overview written for the layman if people are to have faith in the 
results. Second, the results are generated in a more-or-less mechanical 
fashion from the data and from the weightings assigned to the indicators. 
There is a possibility that the data or (less likely) the weightings could be 
altered or manipulated by someone reasonably familiar with the process to 
skew the results for private or political gain. Thus there is a need for a 
periodic audit to insure the integrity of the system. 
 
THE OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 
 
While the pilot plan envisaged significant involvement from community 
organisations and interest groups, this did not materialise for the most part. 
This omission seems to be the result of time pressures and resource 
constraints, as the MCA approach is well suited for community involvement. 
This would be most readily achieved by having community organisations and 
interest groups provide their weightings for the indicators and, perhaps, 
suggest additional indicators. Different weightings are likely to generate 
different priority rankings, and the natural next step would be follow-up 
meetings to analyse the specific conflicts and attempt to arrive at a 
compromise that would garner consensus support. This process would then 
provide the foundation for greater community oversight of the entire mine 
action planning and priority setting process. 
 
THE UTILISATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA 
 
MCA has the capacity to incorporate significant amounts of socio-economic 
data, thus generating priorities based on socio-economic impacts. The pilot 
effort did draw upon some socio-economic data (demographic, agricultural 
land, infrastructure) but further work required to capture these potential 
benefits more completely. The most important step is to extend the analysis 
on basis of cost-benefit logic, which requires the introduction of the cost side 
of the equation.18 Additional improvements would then come from drawing 
upon more data. For an obvious example, agricultural land could be broken 
down by quality and supplemented by crop data.  
 
It must be stressed at this point that not all CROMAC officials appeared 
convinced of the importance of incorporating socio-economic analysis into 
the priority setting process. In part this may stem from the recognition that 
priorities ultimately will be established by elected politicians. However, we 
understand the political directorate has, for the most part, endorsed the 
recommendations put forward by CROMAC, so it is important that these 
recommendations are geared to achieving the maximum socio-economic 
benefit with the available resources.  
 
The apparent lack of concern may also stem from Croatia’s commitment to 
eliminate the impact of mine contamination by the end of 2010 – all the 
important hazards will be cleared within the next eight years, so why spend 
time and money refining the priority-setting process? To our knowledge, no 
cost-benefit analysis of mine clearance has been done in Croatia, so it is 
difficult to quantify the benefits of proper priority-setting. But studies done 
in other mine contaminated countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
suggest these benefits are very large. Given that mine action expenditures 
will need to be in the neighbourhood of US $1 billion by 2010 according to 
The National Mine Action Programme in the Republic of Croatia, the difference 
in economic benefits between optimal and mediocre targeting of mine 
clearance is likely to be some tens of millions of dollars – Appendix 3 
contains a simple analysis designed to get a rough feel for the sums at stake. 
                                                 
18 This does not imply that all indicators must be valued or measured in financial terms, which would 
reduce the problem to a single criterion. Rather, the analysis needs to incorporate both benefits 
(however measured) and costs. Even on the cost side, while most will readily be measured in financial 
terms, at least some indicators could be valued in some other fashion. For example, the danger of 
demining accidents causing deaths or injuries to deminers is one of the costs of mine clearance. 
With a potential economic payoff in the tens of millions of dollars, it is 
important to invest in approaches that might improve the priority-setting 
process. 
 
THE POSSIBILITY FOR DECENTRALISED IMPLEMENTATION 
 
MCA is, in principle, quite suitable for decentralised application. However, 
the regional MACs and county authorities should be supported by dedicated 
staff in CROMAC headquarters. For the next round of CMACs at least, 
additional support from an MCA expert such as Mr. Mladineo would also be 
required. 
 
OTHER ISSUES 
 
MCA very well suited for hierarchical resource allocation problems. It would 
be possible to apply MCA to the national-level ‘strategic’ decision (i.e., how to 
allocate Croatia’s total mine action budget among counties, central 
ministries, and state-owned enterprises) before all the county MAPs are 
completed.19  
 
MCA also appears to have significant potential for application in other mine 
affected countries – initially those possessing significant amounts of data 
(e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina) but potentially, more generally. 
 
Recommendations 
 
First, CROMAC personnel and others involved in the pilot project should 
prepare an explicit proposal for continuing the effort to harness MCA for 
mine action planning and priority-setting and submit this to CROMAC 
management. This proposal should address organisational issues (e.g., 
staffing requirements for a central unit responsible for supporting the 
preparation on CMAPs by the regional MACs and county authorities); 
requirements for outside expertise; a plan and schedule for phased 
introduction into the other counties;20 budget requirements (including the 
costs of data acquisition); etc. As well, the proposal should incorporate the 
following objectives for building on the partial success of the pilot project: 
 
• Devising a better way of defining the alternatives than the polygons of 
suspected contamination; 
• Incorporating indicators of mine action costs so priority rankings reflect 
the expected costs as well as the potential benefits; 
• Obtaining input from civil society organisations and interest groups; 
• Incorporating additional indicators and obtaining the socio-economic 
data needed to quantify or value these; 
                                                 
19 Indeed, it might be easier to apply the approach at this level as counties form a homogeneous set, 
whereas polygons as defined in the pilot study do not. 
20 CROMAC does not appear to have the capacity to introduce the MCA approach in all the other 
mine-contaminated counties in the next phase as the prerequisites – a systematic resurvey plus the 
collection on significant amounts of socio-economic data – represent a good deal of work for each of 
the counties. As well, the pilot project achieved only partial success, so a proven model does not yet 
exist that can simply be replicated in the other counties. 
• Preparation of a document that clearly describes the process of 
developing a CMAP and, in layman’s terms, the general features of the 
MCA methodology. 
 
Consideration should also be given to modelling the national-level priority-
setting problem: how to allocate the national budget among counties and the 
work programmes of central ministries and state owned enterprises? 
 
Second, assuming they approve the proposal, CROMAC management should 
decide whether they wish international involvement. We recommend they 
should seek some support from international donors, but this should be 
structured as a partnership rather than a traditional donor-recipient 
relationship: CROMAC will make a significant contribution to the 
international mine action effort if it can devise a method to harness the 
potential of the MCA approach for mine action planning and priority setting. 
 
Third, assuming CROMAC decides to seek international involvement, UNDP 
and donor agencies should give strong consideration to providing support. 
Ideally, the Croatian-international partnership would involve GICHD and/or 
the Survey Action Center to ensure dissemination of findings and 
subsequent replication in other landmine affected countries. 
 
Fourth, to ensure the mine action planning and priority-setting process is 
transparent, CROMAC should request Croatia’s supreme audit institution to 
devise an audit programme and undertake periodic audits of CMAPs. 
 
Fifth, any system for setting mine action priorities is based on assumptions 
concerning what the cleared land will be used for, by whom, and when it will 
be put to use. We have no way of determining whether these assumptions 
are valid unless post-clearance ‘level 4’ surveys are conducted in a 
systematic manner. CROMAC has not conducted level 4 surveys to date. We 
recommend that it does so. 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE VALIDATION OF THE 
METHODOLOGY USED IN THE FORMULATION OF COUNTY MINE 
ACTION PLANS IN CROATIA 
 
Background 
 
1. The nature of the 1991-95 war in Croatia and the resulting mine and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination are well known and documented 
although there are no reliable records as to the number of mines laid. At one 
time it was thought that 13,000 Km2 were contaminated but this has now 
been reduced to about 1,700 Km2.  
 
2. Fourteen of the twenty-one counties in Croatia are mine 
contaminated. The towns of Sisak, Benkovac, Karlovac, Knin, Osijek and 
Vukovar, all of which are situated on former battle front lines, are also 
affected.  
 
3. Very few of the minefields were marked when laid. Their subsequent 
location and protection from the public has been, and still is, a demanding 
requirement. The presence of mines and UXOs in the country is seen as a 
significant impediment to public safety, reconstruction and development.  
Very little reconstruction is possible without some form of mine action and 
many development projects include a mine action component. The World 
Bank has allocated specific funds to the necessary mine action support to 
reconstruction projects for which it has provided loans.    
 
National Authority 
 
4. To address the socio-economic impact caused by the widespread 
contamination by landmines and unexploded ordnance and to ensure 
optimal use of demining resources, the Government of Croatia (GoC) decreed 
in February 1998, the creation of a Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) 
to provide a national co-ordination and management mechanism for all mine 
action efforts in Croatia and to develop and implement national mine action 
plans.   
 
5. In March 1998, a Decree was passed to establish an inter-ministerial 
“Council of the Croatian Mine Action Centre”, consisting of representatives 
from eight ministries and a President from the Office of the Prime Minister.  
The Council was tasked with approving and monitoring the implementation 
of plans and proposals submitted by the CROMAC. 
 
6. In September 1999 the GoC requested the UN to provide continued 
support in terms of advice and technical assistance to the CROMAC to 
further develop Croatian capacity to conduct all aspects of mines and UXO 
clearance.  It was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding that during 
the course of 2000 the responsibility of the UN mine action assistance 
programme would transfer from UNMAS to UNDP.  
 
7. CROMAC has formulated the current GoC strategy document (‘The 
National Mine Action Programme in the Republic of Croatia’) that was ratified 
by the Croatian Parliament in October 2000. 
 
Ottawa Convention 
 
8. The GoC has signed and ratified the international treaty to ban anti-
personnel landmines (the Ottawa Convention) and in 1999, hosted the 
Second Regional Conference on Anti-Personnel Landmines. CROMAC has 
responsibility for implementing the majority of the treaty obligations (mine 
awareness & risk reduction education, minefield marking, clearance and 
victim assistance), and the Ministry of Defence for stockpile destruction.   
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the overall responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with the treaty and reporting. 
 
Strategic Operational Target 
 
9. In accordance with its obligations under the Ottawa Convention, the 
GoC plans to clear all the mined areas in Croatia by 2010.  The current 
strategy document indicates that a total of 4,500 Km2 of land is mine 
contaminated. Since the document was published, extensive general survey 
operations undertaken as a component of a "pilot" County Mine Action Plan 
for the Sisacko-Moslavacka County have resulted in a substantial reduction 
in the total area believed to be mine contaminated. By extrapolation of those 
results to the other thirteen mine affected counties, it is now estimated that 
the total mine contaminated land area is 1,700 Km2. As actual general 
survey operations are conducted in all mine contaminated counties, a 
further reduction in the total area might well be expected.   
 
10. The ten-year target is nonetheless ambitious and demonstrates the 
GoC’s commitment to clear its territory of mines and UXOs. It has committed 
substantial state funds and has successfully mobilised funds from other 
sources.    
 
CROMAC Capacity 
 
11. In September 2001, an independent evaluation of the UNDP support 
project to CROMAC was undertaken. Among its conclusions, the evaluation 
reported: 
  
• CROMAC’s systems, processes and procedures are well advanced, appear 
better than many other governmental institutions in the country and generally 
better than most other mine action programmes globally. 
 
• The magnitude of the mine problem within Croatia (i.e. its impact on the 
country) is assessed to have diminished in recent years through appropriate, 
cost-effective, and generally well-targeted interventions. Despite this, the 
landmine/UXO problem is subjectively assessed as still having a moderate-
high impact on the country and remains a moderate-high priority issue 
(relative to other aid/development concerns in Croatia) in the eyes of most of 
those interviewed. 
 
12. The Evaluation also reported: 
 
• There is insufficient data readily available to determine whether the 
effectiveness of mine action activities coordinated/managed by CROMAC (i.e. 
the targeting and socio-economic impact of these) has improved or otherwise. 
Nonetheless, indicators such as the marked drop in civilian mine/UXO 
accidents from some 227 in 1991 to around some 22 in 2000 strongly suggests 
that CROMAC (together with all other mine action operators) has been 
adequately targeting priority areas. Despite the lack of comprehensive socio-
economic data, the saving of human lives alone (indicated by the drop in 
civilian accidents and number of in-ground mines/UXO found and destroyed) 
is, in itself, a significant socio-economic achievement.  
 
County Mine Action Plans 
 
13. CROMAC has four Regional Centres (Sisak / Karlovac / Knin / 
Osijek) and as part of its decentralisation plans, responsibility for developing 
County Mine Action Plans (CMAPs) has been devolved to the Regional 
Centres. 
  
14. Last year, in conjunction with the University of Split, and with the 
assistance of a UNDP project Technical Advisor, CROMAC developed a 
methodology for the preparation of a “pilot” Sisacko-Moslavacka CMAP 
which utilized social and economic indicators as well as other criteria and 
the assignment of specific weights.  
 
15. The pilot plan was intended to serve as a model for the staff of all four 
Regional Centres, to create decentralised CMAPs. The model was to be 
transparent, and incorporate community involvement and define priorities 
that took into account social and economic opportunity costs.  
 
16. The methodology for identifying and using socio-economic factors is at 
the core of planning and decision making. This has a direct link with utility 
of factors considered, targeting of clearance and priorities, which in turn has 
a direct influence on related projects, benefits, overall utilization of funds 
and return on such costly investments. Therefore the methodology needs to 
be validated. 
 
Ongoing UNDP Support 
 
17. A new project undertaken by UNDP includes objectives, outputs and 
activities relating to CMAPs. An extract from the relevant section of the 
Project Document is shown at Annex A. 
 
18. The Senior Technical Advisor for the project has commenced his 
appointment in July. 
 
Objectives of the Validation 
 
19. The objectives of the validation are to: 
 
• assess the relevance and effectiveness of the methodology 
employed 
 
• identify any shortcomings in the methodology 
 
• based on the findings, to make recommendations for changes to 
the methodology and improvements that should be included within 
the advice and guidance to be provided by UNDP outlined at Annex 
A. 
 
20. The main stakeholders are: 
 
The County level government authorities  
CROMAC 
 CROMAC Regional Offices 
 Population of fourteen mine affected Counties 
Mine Action operators in Croatia (international / national NGOs and 
commercial companies) 
International community and the GoC in their desire to meet Ottawa 
Treaty goals and to promote socio-economic development in mine 
affected areas of Croatia. 
 
Issues to be addressed 
 
21. In order to achieve the objectives of the validation, the team members 
should address the following issues: 
 
• Guidelines that may have been prepared by the University of Split 
or other material on which criteria for the methodology is based, 
including the assessment of the impact of mine contamination on 
affected communities, socio-economic analysis of mine action and 
priority setting.  
 
• The status of the pilot Sisacko-Moslavacka CMAP and the other 
CMAPs that have since been developed including provision for 
monitoring and evaluation 
 
Methodology of the Validation Team 
 
22. In order to effectively carry out the validation, the following action will 
be necessary: 
 
a. The UNDP Country Office and the project will brief the 
validation team immediately on arrival. The project staff and 
CROMAC will provide logistical support including coordination 
of local transportation, and arrange meetings with appropriate 
stakeholders: Where necessary, an interpreter should be 
provided. 
 
 b. The validation team will: 
 
• through CROMAC, compile relevant documentation for review 
including County Mine Action Plans, and any guidelines 
developed in conjunction with the University of Split. 
 
• conduct interviews which should include the staffs of  
 
CROMAC and the Karlovac Regional Centre,  
County authority which cooperated in the development of the 
“pilot” Sisacko-Moslavacka County Mine Action Plan  
 
Academic staff of the University of Split who participated in the 
development of the methodology. 
 
Validation Team 
 
23. The validation team will be composed of two specialists, one of whom 
participated as a member of the Core Group in the UNDP sponsored Study of 
Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action undertaken by the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in 2000 / 01. The other 
should be a person with extensive experience of management of mine action 
programmes, and implementing similar methodology.   
 
 Time Frame and Conclusions of the Validation Mission 
 
24. The validation Mission is scheduled to begin on [             ]. The total 
duration of the mission is one week (10 days?).  A meeting with CROMAC, 
UNDP, UNOPS and the project should be held at the conclusion of the 
mission. Preliminary findings, recommendations and conclusions in the form 
of an executive summary should be presented at the meeting.  Comments 
made, and conclusions resulting from the meeting will be included in the 
final draft of the report to be submitted to the UNDP Country Office no later 
than one week after the conclusion of the mission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ANNEX A 
EXTRACT FROM PROJECT DOCUMENT 
 
IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE 2: COUNTY MINE ACTION PLANS 
 
Enhance the ability of CROMAC and regional staff to prepare CMAPs for all mine affected 
Counties covering the principal dimensions of humanitarian mine action based on an explicit 
set of transparent and measurable criteria in which social and economic considerations 
dominate 
 
Success Criteria 
 
A demonstrated and internationally recognised capacity of CROMAC and Regional offices to 
prepare CMAPs incorporating an efficient and effective mine action planning and priority 
setting process providing CROMAC with a methodology for completing the remaining CMAP 
and the means for devolving responsibility to Regional offices. This will result in: 
 
   a. Full understanding of all aspects of mine action and its role in the process of 
reconstruction, return and development.  
 
    b. Improved management of prioritisation and planning at all levels within CROMAC, 
and jointly with the relevant ministries and county administrations.  
 
    c. Appropriate decentralisation giving practical responsibility for planning and 
supervising mine action operations to the Regional offices. 
 
    d. A more efficient planning and management capability within CROMAC that operates 
in accordance with the socio-economic factors when setting priorities for mine action. 
 
    e. The ability to complete, without further technical assistance, the remaining CMAP. 
 
     f. CROMAC staff, working in co-operation with the international mine action community, 
to share lessons learned in the development of regional priorities.  
  
Output 2.1  
 
Develop the capacity of CROMAC staff, and at all four Regional Offices, to create a model for 
the decentralised preparation of CMAPs. The model will be transparent and incorporate 
community involvement and will define priorities that take into account social and economic 
opportunity costs.  
 
Activities for Output 2.1 
 
Provide advice and guidance to the CROMAC staff   for them to: 
 
     a. Prepare a Work Plan for the duration of the project specifying target dates, 
quantitative and qualitative achievement benchmarks for Immediate Objective 2. 
 
      b. In conjunction with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), undertake a validation and the refinement, or amendment as necessary, of 
the methodology adopted in the pilot Country Mine Action Priority Plan partially 
completed under project CRO/00/001-Q01. The validation should occur not later than 
July 2002 and express a view on the methodology applied in the use of social and 
economic indicators as well as other criteria and the assignment of specific weights.  
 
     c Prepare a manual or handbook in which the various steps of the process are 
documented, with indications of responsibilities, as well as the methodological and 
procedural steps required to update, monitor or adjust the CMAP.  
 
     d. Identify individuals to be trained in the use of the model at all Regional Offices and 
confirm that the institutional and managerial responsibilities for the preparation, 
updating and operational use of the CMAP are well established.  
 
      e Conduct workshops for the staff of all Regional Offices in preparation for utilising the 
model in all mine affected counties within Croatia and involve identified individuals at 
relevant ministries and county administrations to ensure that all parties understand 
the connections between mine action, reconstruction, return and development and 
the use of socio-economic factors in prioritisation.  
 
       f. Collect data on development and re-integration projects in all mine affected counties 
and information from Level 2 (Technical) and Level 3 (Completion) surveys and 
improve the quality and use of socio-economic information within the Mine Action 
Information System in the formulation of CMAPs. 
 
       g. Conduct monthly progress review meetings with UNDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: List of Indicators 
 
Indicators Measure 
House yards Square metres 
Roads Linear metres 
Agricultural land Square meters 
Rivers Linear metres 
Low voltage network Linear metres 
Waterworks system Linear metres 
Telecommunication system Linear metres 
Power lines Linear metres 
Gas pipelines Linear metres 
Oil pipelines Linear metres 
Railway lines Linear metres 
National parks Square metres 
Nature reserves Square metres 
Tourist areas Square metres 
Hunting areas Square metres 
Flood prevention systems Linear metres 
Border belts Linear metres 
Forests Square metres 
Fire fighting access routes Linear metres 
Return & safety of the population Numbers returning 
Economic facilities Square metres 
  
The following indicators were dropped as they only occurred in one 
municipality. 
Graveyards Square metres 
Border crossings Linear metres 
Collector ? 
Army barracks Square metres 
 
Appendix 3: Benefits of Improved Priority-Setting 
 
 
[will fill-in the explanation if it’s deemed worthwhile, but I have my doubts 
that anything so conjectural is worthwhile.] 
 
 
 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals 
Baseline (1/3 each type)          
 Cost 
   
120,000    120,000   120,000   120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000   
 Benefit 
   
120,000    120,000   120,000   120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000   
 Benefit-Cost             -             -              -              -              -              -              -              -              -    
 Net Present Value             -             -              -              -              -              -              -              -              -    
Optimal            
 Cost 
   
120,000    120,000   120,000   120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000   
 Benefit 
   
205,714    205,714   171,429   102,857    102,857      68,571      51,429      51,429   
 Benefit-Cost 
     
85,714      85,714     51,429 -   17,143  -   17,143  -   51,429  -   68,571  -   68,571            -    
 Net Present Value 
     
85,714      77,922     42,503 -   12,880  -   11,709  -   31,933  -   38,707  -   35,188      75,723  
Delayed optimal          
 Cost 
   
120,000    120,000   120,000   120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000   
 Benefit 
  
120,000    120,000   205,714   205,714    102,857    102,857      51,429      51,429   
 Benefit-Cost             -             -        85,714     85,714  -   17,143  -   17,143  -   68,571  -   68,571            -    
 Net Present Value             -             -        70,838     64,398  -   11,709  -   10,644  -   38,707  -   35,188      38,989  
Poor            
 Cost 
   
120,000    120,000   120,000   120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000    120,000   
 Benefit 
     
77,143      77,143     77,143     77,143      77,143    162,857    205,714    205,714   
 Benefit-Cost 
-    
42,857  -   42,857 -   42,857 -   42,857  -   42,857      42,857      85,714      85,714            -    
 Net Present Value 
-    
42,857  -   38,961 -   35,419 -   32,199  -   29,272      26,611      48,383      43,985  -   59,729    
 
